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Abstract—Many traditional SPAM filters work by analyzing
the content of each email message in turn against a set of
rules that are used to measure the spaminess of the message.
Unfortunately, because spammers have access to these rules,
the content of SPAM messages continually changes to evade
detection. This is similar to the difficulties the immune system
faces in identifying and clearing the Human Immuno-Deficiency
Virus (HIV). Intriguingly, some individuals are resistant to HIV.
We explore the parallels between HIV and SPAM in order
to deduce a method of identifying SPAM that transcends the
polymorphic nature of the SPAM message body. This proposed
method is based on the group behavior of SPAM messages, rather
than on the content of a SPAM message. We are in the process
of implementing a SPAM filter that uses the proposed method.
Index Terms—SPAM filters; HIV; analogies to biological
systems;
I. INTRODUCTION
Many traditional SPAM filters work by analyzing the con-
tent of each email message in turn against a set of rules that are
used to measure the spaminess of the message. Unfortunately,
spammers have access to this software as well, and so they
carefully construct their messages so that they trigger as few
of the rules as possible, and thus get delivered to as many
people as possible[42]. This produces the email equivalent of
an arms race, where the SPAM filters are equipped with a new
rule, the spammers then adapt to evade the new rule, and the
process continues ad infinitum, all the while the general public
must suffer an increasing amount of SPAM in their mailboxes,
give or take the occasional victory[43].
In considering this problem, we have sought to re-frame
the problem by asking the question “is there a way to detect
SPAM, based on something other than content of the mes-
sage?” The result of this questioning is the proposition of the
hypothesis that SPAM can be best identified by focusing on the
behavior of SPAM, that is, a core message which is widely
distributed by a variety of apparent origins. If this method
can be proved successful, it has the strength that it focuses
on the behavior of SPAM, rather than on the content. This is
significant, because while spammers have demonstrated that
the content of a message can be changed regularly, it would
seem much more difficult to change the behavior of SPAM
without endangering their economic model.
II. AN ANALOGY TO BIOLOGY
This approach can be understood by analogy to biology,
where the immune system functions best when target the non-
variable characteristics of pathogens. In contrast, the immune
system can function poorly when faced with a pathogen that
is polymorphic, or otherwise conceals its infection machinery.
This is one of the factors that makes it difficult to develop
vaccines to diseases such as the Human Immuno-Deficiency
Virus (HIV) that causes Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syn-
drome (AIDS) [12]. Several parallels between HIV and SPAM
are now considered.
A. Polymorphic Camouflage
First, HIV uses RNA reverse-transcription to ensure that
the proteins available to the human immune system are
polymorphic[29]. Similarly, in the case of SPAM, the message
body is polymorphic and difficult to match with reliability. A
further parallel is that just as HIV wraps itself in proteins from
cells of the host, and therefore known to the host[29], so too
spammers often wrap their SPAM in blocks of text that are
not SPAM. The significant point in this is that polymorphism
and camouflage are cheap to implement for both HIV and
spammers, but expensive to fight, and ultimately impossible
to defeat directly.
B. Overwhelming Numbers
Second, while the human immune system can identify and
destroy some HIV capsids, the sheer quantity, combined with
volatile polymorphism and numerous defensive techniques[12]
makes it difficult to eliminate them all, and consequentially,
HIV achieves infection[36]. In the case of SPAM, we see a
similar theme of sheer numeracy of messages combined with
frequent polymorphism, making it difficult to identify and
destroy them all, and so “infection” of the e-mail in-boxes of
the world is achieved. Again, the economics are in the favor of
the spammers as the cost of production of each SPAM message
is likely to be much lower than the cost of applying a SPAM
filter to the same message. Moreover, just as virii such as HIV
subvert the hosts cells to replicate, so too spammers frequently
use hijacked computers, thus amplifying their computational
resources without increasing their cost base[42].
C. Low Attack Profile
Recent research has revealed that HIV has very few of the
surface structures that the immune system uses to identify
and destroy viral capsids. For example, HIV has perhaps 30
times fewer available structures for antibodies to bind to when
compared to the similarly sized influenza virus [32], [29]. This
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makes it difficult for antibodies to find two structures within
the range of physical distances that an antibody can reach. This
is an important defense of HIV, because as reported by [29],
the inability to find two features simultaneously dramatically
reduces the efficiency of an immune response. Similarly,
many SPAM messages often contain very few features that
can be identified as indicating SPAM, making it difficult to
conclusively identify them as SPAM. For example, a message
may compose solely of an image or a very short piece of text.
D. Mechanisms of Resistance
Fourth, some individuals demonstrate an unusual resistance
to HIV. While a full understanding of the mechanisms in-
volved, two of the putative mechanisms are: (a) mutation of
receptors that are vital for HIV infection or replication[14];
and (b) a particularly effective immune response, that targets
a non-polymorphic aspect of the virus[29]. In the case of
SPAM, either method is attractive. The various proposed
micro-payment systems, e.g., [16], [25], [33], [38], [31], [9],
[10], [37], [44], can be considered as one analogy to recep-
tor mutation, by preventing the mass-propagation of SPAM.
However, just as it is difficult to adjust the genetic make up
of a living person, it is difficult to retro-fit most payment
systems into the already living internet. This suggests that
it is worth investigating SPAM filters that focus instead in
a more effective immune response rather than targeting the
polymorphic message body of SPAM. One such possibility is
now discussed.
III. USING GENE DISCOVERY TECHNIQUES TO IDENTIFY
HOMOLOGOUS MESSAGES
It has been observed that the message body of SPAM
is polymorphic. However, it must still be functional in the
same way that a virus must be functional in order to infect
an organism. In biology, this property is often associated
with the existence of conserved domains in proteins, that are
sufficiently similar as to be able to fulfill the same biological
function, for example binding to a receptor, or identifying
a chemical signal. The identification of which conserved
domains do and do not occur in a given protein allow the
classification of the protein into one or more families or super-
families of proteins[34].
The “function” of a SPAM message is the communication
of some unsolicited offer and a mechanism for that offer to be
accepted. Thus while the majority of a SPAM message may be
polymorphic, we should expect to find “conserved domains”
that can be used to identify groups of functionally equivalent
messages, i.e., messages that seek to communicate the same
information.
The “conserved domains” in SPAM may take many forms.
For example, in one recent type of SPAM received by the
author the conserved domain was the inclusion of a single
mime-encoded image of a certain approximate size.
A. Detecting Functional Conservation
This is analogous to the discovery of proteins with shared
or similar function in the field of bioinformatics. In that
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF PROTEOMIC SEQUENCE ALIGNMENT USING A
SUBSTITUTION MATRIX.
I F G M M R C
I S S M M Q C
+4 -2 0 +5 +5 +1 +9
setting, various approximate string matching techniques are
such as Local Dynamic Programming used to identify common
regions of messages[15]. However, the regions are not required
to be contiguous, or even in order, since in biological systems
it is common for homologous or paralogous genes to have in-
trons (non-coding regions between the exons that code portions
of the protein), and to have these introns in different locations.
Notwithstanding the computational difficulty of this problem,
various algorithms exist that accomplish this goal. Perhaps it
is time they were adapted for identifying homologous email
messages.
Two related methods that are used in protein matching that
would seem to have relevance to the SPAM matching problem
are: (1) the use of a substitution matrix when comparing letters
of a string; and (2) the use of Karlin-Altschul statistics to
combine the alignment score of multiple matching fragments
of a string to estimate the probability of a match occurring by
chance.
B. Comparing and Scoring Messages
The substitution matrices used in protein comparison have
been devised to compare the amino acids that compose a
protein by taking into account their functional similarity or
distinctiveness. Two popular families of substitution matrices
are BLOSUM[23] and PAM[13], [39]. Table I shows a simple
alignment of two peptides using the BLOSUM62 substitution
matrix. From this simple example it can be seen that while
identical residues typically score most highly, conservative
substitutions that preserve function, e.g., R versus Q, can
also produce positive scores. There necessarily remains a
substantial number of combinations that result in a negative
score, e.g., F versus S, which scores -2.
For the SPAM matching problem we intend to create a
substitution matrix that estimates similarity based on com-
prehensibility. Dimensions that we intend to consider in the
construction of our substitution matrices are: (1) visual sim-
ilarity, e.g., the similar appearance of 1, I, l and | or 0,
O and o in fonts typically used to render email messages;
(2) sound similarity, i.e., scoring substitutions based on how
similar the letters sound, perhaps using the SOUNDEX[24]
system; and (3) the observed frequency of each letter and
the frequency of substitution of each given letter pair in local
dynamic programming matches from various email and SPAM
corpora. Thus, we expect that our substitution matrices will
be constructed using automatic methods that will hopefully
reflect the natural functional properties of ASCII text as
used in SPAM, and allow us to generate alignment scores
for fragments of text from pairs of messages, in much the
same way that the Smith-Waterman[41] algorithm is used to
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compare DNA or protein strings, where the alignment scores
follow an Extreme Value Distribution (EVD).
Of equal importance as finding the alignment between a
pair of sequences, is giving the alignment a score that cor-
rectly indicates its domain significance, whether biological or
otherwise. In biological sequence matching, the NCBI & WU
BLAST[6], [8], [15] and DASH[20], [21], [30], [22] search
programs each differ in the alignment and scores they return,
and these are different again compared with the alignments
and scores returned by the Smith-Waterman algorithm[15], or
by other alignment scoring metrics, such as POZ scores[11].
These algorithms uses statistical significance to estimate
the biological significance. However, the precise interpretation
of biological significance depends heavily on the context[19].
That statistical significance is a valid approximation of biolog-
ical significance is argued by Smith, Waterman & Burks[2].
Therefore, statistical significance remains the dominant me-
chanical approximation for biological significance.
Work by Altschul et al.[8] and Galisson[19] provides some
commentary on the progress made in the statistical issues of
biological sequence searching. Smith et al.[40] modelled the
distribution of nucleic sequence similarities by applying the
work by Erdos and Renyi[17], and Erdos and Revesz[18] on
finding the longest run of heads in a series of coin tosses by
considering nucleotide matches as “heads” and substitutions
as “tails”. Their theory is ideally applicable to non-gapped
alignments with some applicability to gapped alignments. A
similar work that applied only to exact alignments was also
undertaken by Karlin et al.[28]. Altschul et al.[1] and Karlin
and Altschul[26] have also shown that it is possible to use
these results to estimate the combined significance of multiple
nearby alignments. More recently, Booth et al.[11] introduced
POZ-scores as another scoring method that is more resistant
to false positives, but may also increase the false negative rate.
C. Calculating p-Values of Message Pairs and Determining
Homology
These theories provide an accurate statistical model for
alignments of pairs of strings. Their common purpose is to pro-
vide a mechanism to convert between dynamic programming
scores to normalised scores[5]. Such normalised scores are
often measured in “bits” of information by rescaling to base 2
logarithms[4], [3], [8]. Normalised scores allow the calculation
of the probability or expected value for alignments of any
given score, and hence objectively evaluate the statistical
significance of any given alignment. Although the particular
formula varies among sequence alignment tools, the translation
is almost always based on an Extreme Value Distribution
(EVD), with a two stage process that first converts a raw
score, S, into a normalised score, S′, that takes into account
the scoring system. Using the equations indicated by Karlin








λ si j = 1, where pi and p j are the probabilities
of the ithand jth symbols of the alphabet, and si j is the log-odds
score of substituting the same symbols. K is a less significant
factor that is also derived from the scoring system and is used
to correct for the non-random correlation of matching residues
in the alignment of similar sequences.
However, due to the lack of a formal theoretical model
when insertions and deletions are allowed, the values of
various parameters must be estimated by simulation with
either random data or unrelated sequences[8], [19], [35], a
process that will need to be replicated in the email domain to
realise our goals. A particular difficulty with these statistical
estimates for alignments is if the composition of the sequences
differs substantially from that of the data used to calculate
the parameters. In that case the accuracy of the estimations
suffers[19]. The relatedness of these statistical models of
significance to biology are considered by Altschul et al.[7]
and Pearson[35], who, while conceding that the two are not
identical, argue that they are necessarily similar and related.
The continued use of models of statistical significance as
an estimation of biological significance is testimony to their
general suitability to their application in the absence of a better
approach.
Thus it seems reasonable to re-use these methods from
bioinformatics when comparing the content (perhaps narrowed
to subject line and message body) of pairs of email messages,
allowing the calculation of a p-value that estimates the likeli-
hood of two messages being as similar as they are by random
chance. Message pairs with small p-values can be deemed
statistically significant, and if the p-value is very small can
be reasonably judged to be homologous, that is to share some
conserved function, such as deliver an unsolicited message.
D. Using Homology to Detect Forgeries
The advantage of identifying homologous email messages
is that they can then be assessed as a group to determine if
they are likely to be genuine or forgeries, and hence likely to
be SPAM.
One approach to this problem would be to consider the
claimed sender address of the messages. If a set of homologous
messages all claim the same sender, then we can conclude
that they are likely the result of a mailing list, and should
be accepted. If this conclusion is incorrect, then the sender
address in question can be blocked. If the opposite is true,
i.e., the messages exhibit a great diversity in claimed sender,
then we can conclude that only a few of the senders could
possibly be genuine, and that the remainder must therefore be
forgeries and should be rejected. If the number of messages
is sufficiently large, then in all practicality it can be assumed
that all of the homologous messages are forgeries and can be
blocked.
The orthogonality of this method to existing SPAM clas-
sification methods suggests that it may make a significant
contribution to existing SPAM filters in the overall classifica-
tion process. Just as the current method of treating HIV with
multiple anti-retro-viral drugs that target different features has
proved effective, it is hoped that this proposed method will
result in more sucessful long-term management of the disease
that is SPAM.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The advantage of this method is that it is assessing the
spaminess of the email according to its behavior, rather than
the way it is worded. Thus, it would no longer be possible
to escape detection by simply changing the wording of the
message. Indeed, to avoid detection now, each SPAM message
must be substantially different from one another, which is
extremely difficult to arrange while avoiding the traditional
SPAM filters, and still communicating the intent of the mes-
sage. The only other alternative is for all of the SPAM to claim
to come from one source (or a few sources), which provides
a non-polymorphic handle by which to automatically classify
the messages as SPAM. Either way an advantage stands to be
gained in the fight against SPAM.
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